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PRIVACY AND PANDEMICS*
ABSTRACT

The beginning of 2020 marked an unexpected turn for the world, the global pandemic of
COVID-19 has affected every aspect of life. It has also created an unprecedented opportunity
for governments to justify the expansion of their surveillance and collection of data. The
foregoing essay, which was first published in Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive of
the Columbia Law School focuses on two types of data collection - governmental mass collection of nonanonymized location data and state-collected nonanonymized data on people's
health and immunity status. Several countries have applied one or both practices and it is relevant to look into them with legal perspective. Georgia is one of the countries, that also uses
technology for the purpose of locating the possible contacts of the virus infected people, thus
making the comparative analysis extremely relevant locally as well as globally.**

INTRODUCTION

The current COVID-19 pandemic has created an unprecedented opportunity for governments
to justify post-pandemic expansion of their surveillance and collection of data on citizens
and noncitizens alike. The data collected could take multiple forms, but I will focus on two
specific types of data collection.
The first is governmental mass collection of nonanonymized cell phone location data showing the physical location of people in a community without the consent of the surveilled,
who are not suspected of any crime. The second is state-collected nonanonymized data on
people's health or immunity status. Both of these raise fundamental information privacy and

* Reprinted from: Clarisa Long, Privacy and Pandemics, originally published in Pistor, Katharina, "Law in the
Time of COVID-19" (2020). Books. 240. https://scholarship.lawcolumbia.edu/books/240. Reprinted with the
permission of the Author. This article is not included under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 2.0
License of this Journal. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribute NonCommercial ShareAlike 3.0 licence (For more information: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ncsa/3.0/> which permits copy, distribution and transmission of the publication as well as remixing and adapting,
provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, and the original publication is appropriately attributed, and is
distributed under an identical licence. The Journal of Constitutional Law would like to express special gratitude
towards Prof. Long for personally granting the permission to reprint.
** This abstract was drafted by the Editor of the Journal of Constitutional Law. Adaptations if any (including
chapter or title editions) to the paper were made by the Editor of the Journal of Constitutional Law, neither Author, nor the Book or Columbia School of Law are responsible for the present publication.

health privacy concerns. Both would require amendments of existing laws and regulations,
or passage of sweeping new laws, in order to pass legal muster. Post-pandemic, governments
may try to do exactly this.
In the information privacy community the relevant unit of data is "personally identifiable
information," or PII. 2 In the health context, the relevant unit of data is called "protected
health information," or PHI. 3 In times of national or global emergency, such as a pandemic,
governmental collection of PII or PHI that in normal times would be either prohibited by law
or questionable under social norms may become normalized and desirable to combat the
spread of disease.

I. DATA COLLECTION IS DESIRABLE
In times of pandemic, extensive data collection, either of individuals' physical location
or health status, may be desirable from a public health perspective.
Evidence is emerging that countries that tested for COVID-19 early and monitored the
movements of their citizens had better outcomes, both as to infection rates and as to death
rates, than countries like the U.S. that did not engage in early testing and monitoring. In the
New York Times, Anna Sauerbrey says, "Early and persistent testing helps. And so does
tracking people." 4 The Atlantic magazine argues, "More transmissible and fatal than seasonal
influenza, the new coronavirus is also stealthier, spreading from one host to another for several days before triggering obvious symptoms. To contain such a pathogen, nations must
develop a test and use it to identify infected people, isolate them, and trace those they've had
contact with. That is what South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong did to tremendous effect.
It is what the United States did not." 5

II. LOCATION DATA AND COVID-19
Governments around the world are collecting location and tracking data on people in
order to stem the spread of COVID-19.
Contact tracing of infected individuals can be done by using cellphone location data. For ex1 See

Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1814 (2011) (stating that "PII is one of the most central concepts in
privacy regulation. It defines the scope and boundaries of a large range of privacy statutes and regulations.").
3 See HIPAA Guidelines, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 ("Protectedhealth information means individually identifiable
health information.") (emphasis in original).
4 Anna Sauerbrey, "Germany Has Relatively Few Deaths From Coronavirus. Why?," New York Times, March
28, 2020, available at https:flwww nytimes~com/2020103/28/opinion/germane-coronavirushtinI [last accessed
on May 25, 2020] (arguing that aggressive early testing and tracking individuals' locations was responsible for
the relatively death rate from COVID-19 infection in Germany).
5 Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, The Atlantic (March 25, 2020), available at
https//wwtheatlantic.com/ health/archive/2020/03/how-willcoronavirus-end/6O8719/ [last accessed on
May 25, 2020].

ample, government agencies in South Korea used "surveillance-camera footage, smartphone
location data and credit card purchase records to help trace the recent movements of coronavirus patients and establish virus transmission chains," according to the New York Times,
whereas Israel is looking to use previously-collected cell phone location data6 to attempt
contact tracing of individuals potentially infected with COVID-19. 7 Local governmental authorities in Italy are reported to be using citizens cellphone location data to analyze the
degree of compliance with official lockdown orders. 8 The government of Delhi has started
tracking cellphone location data of people who are thought to be infected with COVID-19
and who have been quarantined at home. 9 More governments may choose to do the same.
In the U.S., Google -- a private sector entity, not the government -- says it will be publishing
cell phone location data, but this data is not tied to any one single person. According to
CNN, Google has "said the findings are 'created with aggregated, anonymized sets of data
from users who have turned on the location history setting, which is off by default' in Google's services."10
Such monitoring and tracking of individuals' movements, especially in the early stage of a
pandemic, can be effective, even dramatically effective in slowing the spread of the virus. It
is even more effective and can be targeted when nonanonymized. In such public health
emergencies, data collection of PII can have enormous social benefits. But under existing
U.S. law, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that nonanonymized collection of cell
phone location data by governmental entities is a search protected by the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, and as such, requires a warrant supported by probable cause.1 1
In the lengthy and usually-unread terms of service that cell phone customers have to sign,
cell phone users give wireless companies the ability to collect and sell their location data. 12
Private sector firms that currently collect cell phone location data generally take the position

6 See David M. Halbfinger, Isabel Kershner & Ronen Bergman, "To Track Coronavirus, Israel Moves to Tap
Secret Trove of Cellphone Data," New York Times, March 16, 2020, available at https://wwv.nytiines.comI
20/03/6/world/middleeast/Israelcoronavirs -celphone-tracking.htmi [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
7 Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, The Atlantic (March 25, 2020), available at
https://www.theatlantic.com/ health/archive/2020/03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/ [last accessed on
May 25, 2020].
8

Id.

(citing

hulas://nilano corriere it/notizie/cronaca/20 marzo 17/coronavirus-gallerain-ombardia-

1 640- de essi- 1 6620aositivi-e3875744-686dea-9725-c592292e a85 .shtrnl?refresh ce-cp). [last accessed
on May 25, 2020].
9 See Swati Gupta, "At Least One Indian Territory is Tracking the Phones of Suspected Coronavirus Patients,"
CNN, April 1, 2020, available at httvs://uscnnco world/livenews/coronavirus-andeic-04-0120intl/index.html [last accessed on May 25, 2020] (quoting Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal as saying "We
have made a decision and with help from the police, people who have been asked to quarantine themselves at
home, we will track their phones over the past few days to ensure that they were staying at home.").
10 Amy Woodyatt, Google to release your location data to help fight coronavirus pandemic, CNN Business,
April 3, 2020, available at httys://www.cnnco220/0403/tech/coronavirus-oode-data-sharingintscli/indexhtml [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
" See Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (holding that "The Government's acquisition of the cell-site
records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
12 Shannon Liao, "New York City Might Ban Wireless Companies From Selling Your Location Data," CNN
Business, July 24, 2019, available at https://ti
ban/index. html [last accessed on May 25, 2020].

that the data are anonymized, 3 although some privacy experts believe that even anonymized
cellphone location data, because it is often collected with a high degree of granularity, can be
used to identify individuals. 14 But app creators could write clauses into their Terms of Service saying that users consent to their nonanonymized cell location data being shared with
federal and state authorities, law enforcement or otherwise, in the absence of a warrant (The
degree to which clauses that require individuals to consent in advance to waive their Fourth
Amendment rights, in exchange for receiving cellphone services, are themselves enforceable
is another matter.)

III. SURVEILLANCE MAY BECOME PERMANENT
Once surveillance and data collection mechanisms become established, however, they
could become permanent.
The threats to information privacy, whether in the collection of nonanonymized cellphone
location data or of health status, arise after the pandemic is over. Once the mechanisms to
gather and use PII and PHI have been established to meet a public health emergency, they
may well prove difficult if not impossible to dismantle. And governments face every temptation to leave surveillance protocols in place. History teaches us that once established,
governmental powers of surveillance of, and data collection on, its citizens and residents is
unlikely to be voluntarily scaled back.15 And history has also taught us that once data is collected for one purpose it is difficult to prevent it from being used for other unrelated
purposes.

IV. IMMUNITY STATUS DATA COLLECTION

In addition to collecting PII in the form of cell phone location data, governments might
also collect PHI in the form of COVID-19 test results or immunity results.
An idea that is increasingly gaining traction, both in the U.S. and elsewhere, is that of creating a nonanonymized database of names of individuals who have recovered from the virus
and are thus presumably immune. Dr. Anthony Fauci, the Director of the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) at the National Institute of Health and the U.S.

13 See, e.g., Donie O'Sullivan, "How the Cell Phones of Spring Breakers Who Flouted Coronavirus Warnings
Were Tracked," CNN, April 4, 2020, available at https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/04/tech/location-trackingflorida-coronavrus/index.hunA [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
14 See, e.g., Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Natasha Singer, Michael H. Keller & Aaron Krolik, "Your Apps Know
Where You Were Last Night, and They're Not Keeping It Secret," New York Times, Dec. 10, 2018, available
at hts://www.ny times.com/interactive/2)18/12/10/business/location-data- rivacwa ps~html [last accessed on
May 25, 2020].
15 See, e.g., the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments of 2008, 50 U.S.C. § 1881-81g (2020),
which have been extended several times since their creation, despite "sunset" provisions written into the legislation.

government's top infectious-disease official, has said he believes that such "conferred immunity" protects against reinfection. 16
Germany, for example, is contemplating a proposal to issue "immunity certificates" that
would allow individuals who had tested positive for antibodies to the virus to leave lockdown.1 7 According to the German newspaper Der Spiegel,1 8 researchers at the Helmholtz
Centre for Infection Research in Braunschweig, Germany "want to send out hundreds of
thousands of antibody tests over the coming weeks that could allow people to break free of
the lockdowns." 19 Italy is reported to be considering a similar strategy. 20
For such health care measures to work and to avoid fraud, however, governmental authorities would need to keep a database, similar to driver's license databases, on who holds an
immunity certificate and who does not. That means collecting and recording, in nonanonymized form, the PHI of individuals and their antibody status regarding COVID-19.
This is necessary in order to minimize the opportunity for fraud by people eager to return to
work. (Another concern that has been raised surrounding immunity certificates is "whether
people might deliberately seek to get infected in order to - hopefully - recover and go back
to work," which could undermine the flattening of the infection curve that governments and
health experts are trying to achieve by requiring social distancing. 2 1) And such a database
would provide a juicy target for hackers and trolls.
Immunity databases in times of pandemic - and even post-pandemic - could provide public
health officials with a powerful tool to fine-tune quarantine efforts. Large scale quarantines
can be disastrous for the economy even as they are necessary from a public health perspective. Premature lifting of quarantines and stay-at-home orders could allow COVID-19 to
return with a vengeance. Yet at the same time, the longer people are out of work and nonessential businesses are shut down, the harder it will be for them to recover financially and
for the economy to turn around. Allowing people who have obtained immunity to COVID-

16 See Joshua M. Epstein, Are We Already Missing the Next Epidemic?, Politico Magazine, March 31, 2020,
available at https://wwpoliticocom/news/maazine/22/03/31/coronavirus-americafear-contagion-can-wehandle-it-157711 [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
17 See Daniel Wighton & David Chazan, "Germany Will Issue Coronavirus Antibody Certificates to Allow
Quarantined to Re-Enter Society: Researchers to Test Thousands for Immunity As Berlin Plans Exit Strategy
for Pandemic Lock Down," The Telegraph, March 29, 2020, available at

cquarantined/ [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
" See Sauerbrey, note 3 supra.
See Adam Bienkov, "Germany Could Issue Thousands of People Coronavirus 'Immunity Certificates' So
They Can Leave the Lockdown Early," Business Insider (March 30, 2020), available at
19

htt s:f/www~businessinsidermcom/coronavirus-Germany-covi& 1l9-hnmunity-certificates-testing-sociabdistancing-ockdown-2020-3 [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
20 See Jason Horowitz, "In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right Antibodies, New York
Times," April 4, 2020, available at https://wwwnytimescon/2020/04/04/world/euroge/italy-coronavirusantibodies~htmlaction=click&module=Topo2OStories&Pgtype-Homepa e. [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
21 Laura Smith-Spark, "Is an 'Immunity Certificate the Way to Get Out of Coronavirus Lockdown?," CNN,
April 3, 2020, available at htts://www.
p
lockdown-int/index. html [last accessed on May 25, 2020].

19 to return to work would allow economies around the world to recover faster, and at least
as importantly, would allow individuals to regain their own financial equilibria.

V. CHALLENGES TO INFORMATION PRIVACY

This raises important issues and challenges to information privacy and health privacy
law.
Post-pandemic, how can federal, state, and local governments thread the needle of mounting
effective and timely responses to a fast-moving public health crisis, while simultaneously
protecting (or at least not worsening) existing legal protection for PHI? Existing state-level
models may provide a template for further exploration.
Several states have laws requiring medical professionals to provide health risk information to
potentially affected individuals through contact tracing. 22 For instance, New York State's
HIV Reporting and Partner Notification law (HIVRPN) law allows for contact tracing of
cases of AIDS, HIV related illness or HIV infection. 23 It requires that "[d]octors and labs
must report to the Health Department the names of persons with HIV infection, HIV illness
and AIDS" and "must also report the names of sex and needle-sharing partners of people
who test HIV positive that are known to the doctor." 24 The HIVRPN has been described as
"one of the most aggressive statutes to protect the public [... o]n a spectrum that puts individual patient confidentiality on one end and public health protection on the other." 25
Although not without controversy, the HIVRPN has been lauded in the affected communities
as a public health success, 26 and the New York State Department of Health takes the information privacy requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) into account when enforcing state public health laws. 27
Post-pandemic, one key issue that must be addressed head on, should governmental data-

22 See, e.g., N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2130: Communicable diseases; control of dangerous and careless patients; commitment.
23 See N.Y. Pub Health § 2133: Contact tracing of cases of AIDS, HIV related illness or HIV infection.
24 N.Y. State: Dep't of Pub. Health, What Is Partner Notification?, available at https://www.health.ny.gov/
diseases/ aids/providers/regulations/reportingandnotification/aboutthe_law.htm#quest2 (stating that "[d]octors
and labs must report to the Health Department the names of persons with HIV infection, HIV illness and
AIDS" and "must also report the names of sex and needle-sharing partners of people who test HIV positive that
are known to the doctor").
25 Jacquelyn Burke, Discretion to Warn: Balancing Privacy Rights with the Need to Warn Unaware Partners of
Likely HIV/AIDS Exposure, 35 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 89, 105 (2015).
26 See N.Y. State Dep't of Health Aids Inst., The Impact Of New York's HIV Reporting And Partner Notification
(Hivrpn) Law: General Findings Report 5 (2006), available at
hopsj/www.health ny.gov/diseaseslaids/vroviders/regulations/renortin and notification/docs/iin actrevort.vd
f [last accessed on May 25, 2020] (showing that "[a] study of 132 partners of HIV- positive individuals located
through health department notification found that 87% thought the Health Department did the right thing in telling them about their exposure, and 92% thought that the Health Department should continue to notify persons
exposed to HIV.").
27 See Office of Mental Health, New York State, "Information for Consumers:
Privacy Rule," available at
htns://omhrny.ov/oahweb/hipa consumers/trivacv/ [last accessed on May 25, 2020].

base(s) of immunity status be created at the federal or state level, is obtaining informed consent from each of the individuals in such a database to share their nonanonymized testing
results with state authorities. This might seem like a no-brainer -- who would not mind the
state knowing their antibody status if it meant they could return to work earlier and be released from stay-at-home orders? -- but the underlying issues and implications are not so
simple. Given how little the scientific community knows about COVID-19, it is not clear
that even a positive test for antibodies is a guarantee of immunity. Similarly, false positive
tests -- in which a person inaccurately tests positive for the antibody, and therefore appears
immune when in fact they are not -- could undermine the effectiveness of an immunity database. And because all viruses mutate, individuals' immunity status would have to be updated
periodically as the virus mutates over time, so reporting immunity status would likely not be
a one-time event.

Like HIV, COVID-19 is a transmissible virus that can be readily diagnosed, and for which
early detection and treatment are clearly beneficial. Because immunity, whether from vaccination or from successful recovering from a COVID-19 infection, would be viewed as a
desirable status, this does not present some of the concerns of social or economic discrimination that a database of results like HIV-positive status present. Even so, such a database of
non-anonymized PHI, available to an array of government actors, represent a departure from
existing laws and norms regarding the treatment of PHI.
The least controversial route, from a privacy perspective, would be to create a voluntary optin government database of people with immunity status, with no penalties for declining to
opt in. But as a public health response to monitoring seropositive status after the current
pandemic, voluntary self-reporting of non-anonymized immunity status would be only a partial solution. Public health responses that rely on voluntary cooperation of mass numbers of
people, some of whom may not have cellphones or even internet access, will not be as effective as mass mandatory self-reporting. 28
Legal rules and social norms regarding state collection of nonanonymized PHI might not
necessarily stop with COVID-19. COVID-19 is not the only transmissible virus. The slope
from non-anonymized COVID-19 immunity databases, to governmental collection of nonanonymized information about individuals' immunity status to other viruses, then to their
vaccination records, then to their public health wellness generally, is a slippery one indeed.

The Associated Press, School Shutdowns Raise Stakes of Digital Divide for Students,
New York Times,
March 30, 2020, available at htts:Hwww'n times.con/a online/2020/03/30/us/a -us-virus-outbreak-di itadivideahtml [last accessed on May 25, 2020].
28

CONCLUSION

These issues will not be going away.
There will always be a next pandemic at some point in the future, if not of COVID-19 then
of some other infectious agent. The challenges that pandemics present to information privacy
are not going to go away or lessen any time soon. After the current pandemic is over, lawmakers, public health experts, and information privacy advocates need to address these
issues and balance privacy protection with public health concerns so that countries can be
better prepared for the next pandemic, whenever it may come.

